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| **Meeting title:** Visiting Lecture: Rational Sentimentalism |
| **Date:** 4.4.2024.  |
| **Time:** 18.00 |
| **Place:** Zoom |
| **Zoom link:** Odsjek za filozofiju Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Join Zoom Meeting[https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88113689890?pwd=NGc1VExvVVUvbHgra0xFY1RvS2RuUT09](https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88113689890?pwd=NGc1VExvVVUvbHgra0xFY1RvS2RuUT09" \t "https://mail.proton.me/u/0/inbox/_blank) Meeting ID: 881 1368 9890Passcode: 457971 |
| **Duration:** 1 hour and 40 minutes |
| **Participants:** Justin D’Arms, Boran Berčić, Andrej Jandrić, Matija Rajter, Aleksandar Božić, Anastasija Filipović, David Grčki, Aleksandra Goubović, Ema Lalić, Nikola Jandrić, Iris Vidmar |
| **Absentees:** - |
| **Agenda:**1. Justin D’Arms delivered the talk „Rational Sentimentalism*“*
2. Discussion, questions and comments
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| **Meeting summary:** On Thursday 4.4.2024. the team of the MetPhil project gathered to listen to a visiting lecture held over the Zoom platform. The speaker for this visiting lecture was Jason D’Arms who held a talk based on his new book titled “Rational Sentimentalism” which he wrote with Daniel Jacobson. Once D’Arms concluded his talk the discussion section has been opened in which the participants of the lecture presented their questions and comments to the author. |
| **Talk summary:**D’Arms and Jacobson give us in their book a theory of specific human values which they call *sentimental values*. This is not intended to be a general theory of values. Philosophers mostly ignore these values, but these are extremely important values. These values account for a lot that actually matters for people, therefore they should get more philosophical attention. Examples of sentimental values are: funny, shameful, disgusting, prideworthy, enviable, fearsome etc. All of these, we say, are human values and all of them are tied to natural emotions (emotions that are features of human nature). Each natural emotion involves evaluating something as good or bad; sentimental values are those ways of being good or bad. Another important feature of sentimental values is that they are “response-dependent”: they cannot be fully explained or captured without appealing to the relevant emotions.Each rational emotion has its distinct evaluation. Different theories of what emotions are try to explain this idea of emotional evaluation differently. We can conclude that every natural emotion and sentimental value is different from others in significant ways, and these differences matter in thinking about these values and emotions.Rational sentimentalism says for something to be valuable (funny, shameful) is for it to merit the associated emotion: its for the associated emotion to be fitting. E.g., what it is for something to be shameful is for it to be connected to shame. If you think its shameful to be ignorant about some subject, you think that kind of ignorance merits shame.All of the sentimental values are genuine values, but are values for human beings and not for other rational creatures. These values really matter, we care about them; these are basic and distinctive values that connect to deep human concerns. This account is supposed to be normative, not just dispositional. For instance, something is shameful iff it merits shame, *not* iff most people are ashamed of it. The concept of merit or fitting is a normative one.Questions and CommentsBerčić* What comes first, reasons for being ashamed or being ashamed?
* There is an analogy between the color red and the emotion shameful, the question is what does it mean for the normal observer?
* The view of the author is that there are facts that someone doesn’t know, and shamefulness is not contained in the facts, rather it is contained in the way we should react towards these facts - in a sense his position is a noncognitivism about the facts, but he is *not* a noncognitivist about the norms that guide our reaction to these facts. Can the author comment on this?

Filipović* The author supposes that there are universal emotions, what are his reasons for that claim?

Grčki* There is a long road between the initial reaction of emotion to values, what is the explanatory model we use to bridge that gap?

Jandrić* Where does the theory this theory of emotions stand with regards to neurophysiological theory of emotions?

Vidmar* What comes first, reasons for being ashamed or being ashamed?
* Follow up question to Berčić. The author claims that he is rejecting the cognitivist theory of emotion. But then at the same time he has this notion that what it meansf for something to be shameful is that it merits shame. How does the author explain this notion of recognizing that there are reasons?
* How would the author explain the example of the professor who doesn’t know who Bertrand Russell is? Would it be a lack of perception, lack of character, lack of judgement, or something else?
* What role does the character play in recognizing various types of emotions?
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