|  |
| --- |
| **Meeting title:** Workshop 6: The Unavoidability of Metaphysics |
| **Date:** 9.5.2024.  |
| **Time:** 18.00 |
| **Place:** Zoom |
| **Zoom link:** Odsjek za filozofiju Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Join Zoom Meeting<https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81959464518?pwd=b2xJRDh4SWkvWkpMMGVhbnExY2kwdz09>Meeting ID: 819 5946 4518Passcode: 603675 |
| **Duration:** 1 hour and 40 minutes |
| **Participants:** Boran Berčić, Filip Čeč, Andrej Jandrić, Matija Rajter, Danica Radoš, Justin Weinberg, Vito Balorda, David Grčki, Filip Grgić |
| **Agenda:**1. Filip Čeč delivered the talk “The Unavoidability of Metaphysics”
2. Discussion, questions and comments
 |
| **Meeting summary:** On Thursday 25.4.2024. the team of the MetPhil project convened to hold their sixth workshop over the Zoom platform. The topic of the sixth workshop was the talk held by Filip Čeč titled “The Unavoidability of Metaphysics”. The activities of the workshop were organized into two parts; first, Čeč delivered his talk, after which the members of the MetPhil project and the audience presented their questions and comments regarding the content of the talk. |
| **Talk summary:**The central theme of the talk delivered by Čeč was the defense of the so-called big picture approach to metaphysics as envisioned by E.J. Lowe. One of the main reasons as to why we should endorse the big picture approach, arguers Lowe, is because there exists a need for a forum for boundary disputes between other disciplines. Metaphysics plays a central role in this picture because it represents a universal truth-checking arena within which we can measure mutual consistency. Why should metaphysics be suitable for such a task? The answer lies in the fact that metaphysics is the only discipline that presupposes a universal subject matter in the form of the indivisibility of truth. To offer support to the claim that metaphysics presents an universal truth-checking arena we have to address various efforts that try to eliminate metaphysics as a discipline. To this end Čeč offers a general argument for the ineliminability of metaphysics:* To eliminate metaphysics, one should offer an argument whose content isn’t metaphysical.
* But any argument that criticizes metaphysics presents itself as having a metaphysical content.
* Therefore, it is impossible to offer an argument outside metaphysics’ scope.
* Metaphysics is ineliminable.

By following Lowe’s argumentation, we arrive at the thesis of the indispensability, ineliminability and unavoidability of metaphysics. However, before we can draw any final conclusion it is important to address one of the most influential criticisms directed at the practice of metaphysics, namely the one which is formulated by Rudolf Carnap. To answer the Carnapian challenge Čeč introduces the differentiation between metaphysics as a product and as an activity, which is itself influenced by Bas van Frassen’s distinction between science as a product and activity. In this way Čeč frames Carnap’s criticism as constituting metaphysics as an activity which enables him to refute said criticism.Questions and CommentsBerčić* He thinks that the arguments about something being self-refuting are cheap victories
* Lowe’s argument seems interesting – as soon as you have more than one science, you have metaphysics.
* An example that is relevant for the author – a debate in 90’s Croatia in Ruđer Bošković institute between physicists and Jesuits – Jesuits try to show that science is compatible with religion, they were claiming that there are multiple notions of truth, and they are therefore incompatible – religion and science are not contradicting itself because they are completely incompatible domains.
* How is the metaphysics as activity a brute fact if we are giving an argument for it?

Božić* Regarding this he is wondering if he correctly understood the proposed role which metaphysics should play in this arena where different sciences could elucidate their relationship. It is not clear in which way metaphysics can elucidate the relationship between biology and physics

Grčki* He agrees with the unavoidability of metaphysics
* How is the term ‘impossibility’ used in the arguments of the author?
* He likes the idea of doing everyday metaphysics, but can the author elaborate on it further?

Jandrić* Is the sole purpose of metaphysic really to measure the consistency of separate sciences? Isn’t logic enough for that task?
* The author has to argue that doing metametaphysics is just doing another bit of metaphysics

Rajter* Why is it exactly that Carnap’s criticism constitutes a metaphysical activity? Can we account for this type of criticism without invoking the methods or concepts of metaphysics?
* Can the idea of meta linguistic frameworks be used to account for the idea of the indivisibility of truth and therefore eliminate the need for metaphysics?

Weinberg* What does the author think about the distinction between metaphysics and meta-metaphysics? Can this distinction track the distinction between activity and product?
* It seems like when people criticize metaphysics the reasons that they might be relying on for that might be something like a epistemic situation of metaphysics or some kind of inductive argument. Either way, metaphysics is going to fail in it’s project. If Čeč’s argument works then he shows that those kinds of arguments are ineliminable metaphysical. But that seems like a small victory because the critics can say fine, you’ve got us, we have got to do a little bit of metaphysics here. But the main point stands, that metaphysics stands for these other reasons
 |
|  |