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Objects, Proxy Objects and Concepts in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein describes elementary sentences as concatenations of names, and the states of affairs they represent as configurations of objects which these names refer to. He does not seem to make room either for predicates in the elementary sentences, or for concepts, properties or relations as constituents of states of affairs. Although such view is at odds both with Frege's and with Russell's views, I will argue that its philosophical sources are to be found in Frege's concept *horse* paradox and Russell's understanding of a proposition's being about a certain object. Frege's notorious claim that the concept *horse* is not a concept, but an object, indicates that objects can be used as proxies to represent concepts in sentences. Russell, on the other hand, understood propositions as structured entities that contain objects they are about as their constituent parts; in his view, an object cannot feature in the content that a sentence expresses in a merely accidental way, but characterises it necessarily. It is the adoption of these two insights (one from Frege and one from Russell) that led Wittgenstein to his controversial claims about objects and names in the *Tractatus*.