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| **Meeting title:** Objects, Proxy Objects and Conecpts in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* |
| **Date:** 17.12.2024. |
| **Time:** 18.00 |
| **Place:** Zoom |
| **Zoom link:**  Join Zoom Meeting [https://us02web.zoom.us/j/86533972925?pwd=XAnI8rPvoCbhHqeVTQPWVNRmP3KK20.1](https://us02web.zoom.us/j/86533972925?pwd=XAnI8rPvoCbhHqeVTQPWVNRmP3KK20.1" \o "https://us02web.zoom.us/j/86533972925?pwd=XAnI8rPvoCbhHqeVTQPWVNRmP3KK20.1" \t "/home/matija/Documents\\x/_blank) Meeting ID: 865 3397 2925 Passcode: 689515 |
| **Duration:** 1 hour and 40 minutes |
| **Participants:** Boran Berčić, Andrej Jandrić, Mark Balaguer, Matija Rajter, Vito Balorda, Danica Radoš, Aleksandar Božić |
| **Agenda:**   1. Andrej Jandrić delivered the lecture “Objects, Proxy Objects and Concepts in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*” 2. Discussion, questions and comments |
| **Meeting summary:**  On Monday 17.12.2024. the team of the MetPhil project gathered to listen to the talk of Andrej Jandrić titled “Objects, Proxy Objects and Conecpts in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*”. In the first part of the talk Jandrić presented his talk in which he explained why Wittgenstein does not make room either for predicates in elementary sentences, or for concepts, properties, or relations as constituents of states of affairs. The team of the MetPhil project then presented their questions and comments regarding the content of the talk. |
| **Talk summary:**  This talk investigated an interesting point of departure Wittgenstein took in his *Tractatus* from the views of Frege and Russell. This departure is evident if we analyze elementary sentences, which Wittgenstein took to be concatenations of names, and the states of affairs they represent, which he thought to be configurations of objects these names refer to. The departure consists of the fact that such a picture does not admit of predicates in elementary sentences, or of concepts, properties or relations in states of affairs. Jandrić claims that the source of such an ontology is to be found in Frege and Russell themselves, in (1) Frege’s concept *horse* paradox and in (2) Russell’s understanding of a proposition’s being about a certain object. The way in which we can avoid talking about concepts in sentences is to rely on so-called proxy objects, an insight which we draw from Frege’s discussion on the concept *horse* paradox. From Russell we can conclude that an object cannot feature in the content that a sentence expresses in a merely accidental way, but characterises it necessarily. Jandrić claims that, by relying on these two frameworks, we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s views regarding objects and names in the *Tractatus*.  Questions and Comments  Berčić   * What exactly is the main question that Jandrić tried to address in his talk, does it concern the way in which Wittgenstein can talk about relations and properties in the *TLP*? * Would Anscombe’s interpretation of the *TLP* support a kind of class nominalism? * Anscombe’s comment reminds him of the following interpretation of Wittgenstein: what has ontological priority, facts or objects? According to this interpretation facts have priority, and then we abstract the objects from the series of facts about said objects. * Could Jandrić sum up the point regarding proxy-objects?   Rajter   * If Wittgenstein leaves open room for abstract objects, why does he insist on such a radical nominalism? |
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