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| **Meeting title:** Conceptual Analysis and Scientific Explanation |
| **Date:** 16.10.2025.  |
| **Time:** 18.00 |
| **Place:** Zoom platform |
| **Zoom link:** Filozofija Doktorski is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Join Zoom Meeting<https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84924891639?pwd=hq0YlIqy8FOlU86aw2i74CwnV2Xjzs.1> Meeting ID: 849 2489 1639Passcode: 961912 |
| **Duration:** 1 hour and 40 minutes |
| **Participants:** Boran Berčić, Mark Balaguer, Vito Balorda, Justin Weinberg, Filip Grgić, Andrej Jandrić, Matija Rajter |
| **Agenda:**1. Mark Balaguer delivered the talk “How to Be a One-Thinger”
2. Discussion, questions and comments
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| **Meeting summary:** On Thursday 16.10.2025. the MetPhil project team organized the twelfth workshop in the series. The topic of this workshop was a talk given by Mark Balaguer titled “How to Be a One-Thinger”. In the first part of the workshop Balaguer gave the talk in which his ultimate aim was to undermine a wide class of arguments which purport to show the existence of either coincident objects or 4D objects. The second part of the talk was dedicated to a Q&A session where the audience presented their questions and comments to the authors. |
| **Talk summary:**In this workshop Mark Balaguer tried to undermine a wide class of arguments he calls *save-our-intuition arguments* which purport to show the existence of either coincident objects or 4D objects. Balaguer gives the following definition for *coincident objects*: “Two objects are *coincident* iff (a) they’re numerically distinct, and (b) they have the same location and they’re made of the same matter (or composed of the same parts)” (Balaguer handout). The definition for a *4-dimensional object* is the following: “An object O is a *4-dimensional object* (*4D object*) iff (i) O is located at multiple times, and (ii) for each time t at which O is located, it has a temporal part that’s located only at t” (Balaguer handout). He also gives the following definition of *4-dimensionalism (4Dism)*: “The view that (a) there are 4D objects, and (b) ordinary objects (i.e. things like cats and rocks and statues) are 4D objects” (Balaguer handout). The overarching aim of this talk is to undermine so-called *save-our-intuition arguments*; certain folk sentences which are obviously true, and in order for them to be true 4D objects have to exist and so they do. Balaguer then responds to these types of arguments by developing a novel theory of reference that explains how these sentences can be true even if 4D objects don’t exist. In other words, Balaguer defends the view he calls *3D-one-thingism*: “The view that (a) there are no such things as coincident or 4-dimensional objects (or past or future objects – so 3D-one-thingism entails *presentism*), and (b) every physical object is identical to a bare 3-dimensional (presently existing) hunk of matter – in particular, the 3-dimensional hunk of matter that constitutes it – and these objects are not spread out in time (i.e., they’re not located at any other times other than the present time), and they’re not coincident with any other objects” (Balaguer handout). The novel theory of reference which should explain the truth of the save-our-intuition arguments is called *Names Follow Properties* (NFP). Balaguer outlines NFP via the following three parts – “*Part 1*: We use ordinary names like ‘Statchy’, ‘Lumpy’, ‘Obama’, etc. to refer to 3D hunks of matter. So, e.g., ‘Statchy’ and ‘Lumpy’ are coreferential—i.e., they both denote the SL-hunk. *Part 2*: Every ordinary name is associated with a property—a *keep-referring property—*that an object (i.e., a hunk of matter) needs to have (and keep having) in order to be (and keep being) a referent of the given name. (…) *Part 3*: While names refer to hunks of matter, they almost never keep referring to the same hunk for very long; rather, they stay connected to their keep-referring properties and refer to the often-changing new hunks of matter that have those properties” (Balaguer handout).Questions and Comments**Grgić*** The Stoics were in a sense also One-thingers. They were just talking about different properties of one and the same thing. Aristotle was also a One-thinger.

**Weinberg*** Although a proton existed in the 1700’s, no one was referencing protons back then. How does NFP deal with these kinds of cases?
* How much metaphysics is smuggled into the continuity relation, what does he mean by the continuity relation?
* He thinks Balaguer’s view has intuitive appeal.
* His theory is not intended to solve problems of personal identity?

**Berčić*** What does Balaguer want to say in the lump and statue case, that we are talking about the same thing, or that we are talking about the same property, what is his claim exactly?
* Assume that you are a sculpture and in your studio is a beautiful piece of marble. When I visit you I always admire this piece of marble. One day I visit you and there is no more piece of marble. Then I ask you where it went. In the meantime you turned it into a sculpture. What would be your answer to my question?
* Your picture of meaning and reference, do you have any other example where your view fits?
* One person believes that first we have one thing and then we have another thing. Is he a One or Two-thinger?
* There is the standard package that 4-dimensionalism includes the possibility of overlapping objects. In his opinion these are two different and distinct intuitions that have different sources.
* What’s the point of the reference rule?

**Rajter*** How would Balaguer define a singular hunk of matter?
* Can we understand one person as constituting one singular hunk of matter?
* How do we identify which property is the keep referring property of an entity?

**Jandrić*** Suppose that Lumpy is identical to Statchy in t1. What the author said really is that names do not behave like definite descriptions but that the semantic values are the objects themselves. Suppose that it is true that a lump of clay is formed into a statue and so Lumpy is the same as Statchy. So Lumpy refers to the same hunk of matter as Statchy. What they bring to the sentence, is it the same hunk of matter or not?
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